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THE SKY IS NOT THE LIMIT: MUTUAL TRUST 
AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION APRÈS ARANYOSI 
AND CǍLDǍRARU
Adam Łazowski *
Summary: In the present article, judgments of the European Court of 
Justice, together with the case of Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru, are put 
under the academic microscope. The analysis is conducted through 
the lenses of domestic judges. It starts by drawing a broader picture 
of the challenges that the domestic judiciary faces when it comes to 
EU criminal law, in particular the mutual recognition instruments. It 
argues that judges are faced not only with the legal framework of 
sometimes questionable quality but also with potential confl icts of 
loyalty resulting from the multiplicity and occasional inconsistency of 
applicable legal regimes. In turn, the analysis moves to the exegesis 
of the Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru line of jurisprudence, in particular to 
the already mentioned security vs justice conundrum, which domestic 
judges sometimes face. The article ends with conclusions looking into 
the current state of affairs, and suggestions are made regarding the 
way forward.
1 Introduction
As Ernest Hemingway wrote: ‘the way to make people trust-worthy 
is to trust them’.1 This, however, is easier said than done. Unless one 
deals with a case of blind trust, it is well known that for trust to develop 
several preconditions have to be met. And then, in equal measure, trust 
may be gained, put to the test and eventually lost. The fi rst frequently 
takes a long time, the second and the third may happen in a split second 
and, once the damage is done, it is rather diffi cult to recover. When it 
comes to EU law, trust, or more precisely the principle of mutual trust, 
has from the start been a cornerstone of the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice and, at the same time, a precondition for mutual recogni-
tion in criminal matters.2 However, from the early days questions have 
*  Professor of Law of the European Union, Westminster Law School, London; https://orcid.
org/0000-0002-5103-1232; DOI: 10.3935/cyelp.14.2018.313.
1  C Baker (ed), Ernest Hemingway Selected Letters 1917-1961 (Letter to Dorothy Connable 
(17 February 1953) Charles Scribner’s Sons 1981) 805.
2  For an academic appraisal see, inter alia, A Suominen, The Principle of Mutual Recognition 
in Cooperation in Criminal Matters (Intersentia 2011); Ch Janssens, The Principle of Mutual 
Recognition in EU Law (OUP 2013); L Klimek, Mutual Recognition of Judicial Decisions in 
European Criminal Law (Springer 2017); W van Ballegooij, The Nature of Mutual Recognition 
in European Law (Intersentia 2015); E Xanthopoulou, ‘Mutual Trust and Rights in EU Crim-
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been raised about whether the sky is the limit or, alternatively, where the 
limits to mutual trust and mutual recognition lie.3 These questions have 
arisen not only in academic discourse but also among national judges.4 
A reminder is fi tting that according to the well-established and rehearsed 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, national courts are in charge of the 
enforcement of EU law and, by the same token, are entrusted to secure its 
effectiveness.5 Furthermore, the European Union is based on the rule of 
law and, following the recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, it can 
be upheld only if national courts are independent. So, the role of domestic 
courts in the development of the EU legal order is paramount; national 
judges are also EU judges. This applies to all areas of EU law, starting 
with the free movement of goods and ending with judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. The latter is, however, a relatively new phenomenon. 
While the foundations were laid in the early 1990s qua the Treaty on Eu-
ropean Union, the area in question only started to develop more robustly 
at the turn of the century and, at the time of writing, it was still in its 
formational years.6 As legislative activity has steadily continued, the en-
forcement of the adopted rules, in particular the controversial litmus test 
for mutual recognition − the European arrest warrant − has been heading 
for troubled waters. Mutual trust, and consequently also mutual recog-
nition, has been cracking, as respect for human rights in several Mem-
ber States, for instance in relation to detention conditions, has become 
questionable.7 The foundations of mutual recognition have also started to 
inal and Asylum Law: Three Phases of Evolution and the Uncharted Territory Beyond Blind 
Trust (2018) 55 CML Rev 489. For doubts about whether this was the right way forward, 
see, for instance, S Peers, ‘Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the European Union. 
Has the Council Got It Wrong? (2004) 41 CML Rev 5 
3  See, eg, V Mitsilegas, ‘The Limits of Mutual Trust on Europe’s Freedom, Security and 
Justice. From Automatic Inter-State Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual’ 
(2012) 31 YEL 319.
4  See, for instance, the reference for a preliminary ruling submitted by the Finnish Korkein 
oikeus in Case C-105/10 Public prosecutor v Malik Gataev, Khadizhat Gataeva [2010] OJ 
C100/32. The reference, however, was subsequently withdrawn by the referring court and 
removed from the register of the Court of Justice. 
5  Post Lisbon Treaty this stems from Article 19 TEU, as confi rmed by the Court of Jus-
tice, inter alia, in Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de 
Contas ECLI:EU:C:2018:117. For an academic appraisal, see, eg, M Bonelli and M Claes, 
‘Judicial Serendipity: How Portuguese Judges Came to the Rescue of the Polish Judiciary: 
ECJ 27 February 2018, Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses’ (2018) 
14 EUConst 622.
6  See, inter alia, V Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 5; S Miettinen, ‘The 
Evolution of Competence Distribution Between the European Union and the Member States 
in the Criminal Field’ in Ch Brière and A Weyembergh (eds), The Needed Balances in EU 
Criminal Law. Past, Present and Future (Hart Publishing 2018); V Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law 
after Lisbon. Rights, Trust and the Transformation of Justice in Europe (Hart Publishing 2016).
7  See, for instance, Report to the Hungarian Government on the visit to Hungary carried 
out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
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break, as Poland and Hungary have become rather economical in their 
compliance with Article 2 TEU.8 
To put it differently, the questionable human rights records and the 
brewing rule of law crises in several Member States have forced not only 
the EU institutions to act but also persuaded national judges around the 
European Union to become more vocal about their doubts as to the lim-
its of mutual trust and mutual recognition. The judgment in the Joined 
Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru9 is a very 
good example of when such doubts are shared with the Court of Jus-
tice, which − as is well known − provides assistance to national courts 
when interpretation of EU law is unclear, or when the validity of sec-
ondary legislation is under scrutiny.10 This time the judges at Kirchberg 
were dragged into the dilemmas of their domestic counterparts as where 
to draw the line between the three constituent elements of the man-
tra: freedom, security and justice and how to answer the paraphrased 
Shakespearean question: to surrender or not to surrender. Although the 
judgment in question is, without a shadow of doubt, a groundbreaking 
development, it has also been − as rightly put by W Van Ballegooij and 
P Bárd − ‘only the start of a discussion between the CJEU and national 
courts on the scope and application of the fundamental rights excep-
tion’.11 This has proven to be true in the most recent jurisprudence on 
Treatment or Punishment (CPT 2014) from 3 to 12 April 2013 (CPT/inf 2014) available at 
<https://rm.coe.int/1680696b7f> accessed 23 December 2018. 
8  See, inter alia, Z Szente, ‘Challenging the Basic Values: The Problems of the Rule of Law 
in Hungary and the Failure of the European Union to Tackle Them’ in A Jakab and D Ko-
chenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values (OUP 2017); B Bugaric and A Kuhelj, 
‘Varieties of Populism in Europe: Is the Rule of Law in Danger?’ (2018) 10 Hague Journal 
of Rule of Law 21; W Rech, ‘Some Remarks on the EU’s Action on the Erosion of the Rule 
of Law in Poland and Hungary’ (2018) 26 Journal of Contemporary European Studies 334; 
P Filipek, ‘Challenges to the Rule of Law in the European Union: The Distressing Case of 
Poland (2017) 17/18 Revista do Instituto Brasileiro de Direitos Humanos /Journal of the 
Brazilian Institute of Human Rights 211.
9  Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15PPU Pál Aranyosi and Robert Cǎldǎraru v Gener-
alstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198. For an academic appraisal, see, inter 
alia, G Anagnostaras, ‘Mutual Confi dence Is Not Blind Trust! Fundamental Rights Protection 
and the Execution of the European Arrest Warrant: Aranyosi and Caldararu (2016) 53 CML 
Rev 1675; Sz Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘Joined Cases Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru: Converging Human 
Rights Standards, Mutual Trust and a New Ground for Postponing a European Arrest War-
rant (2016) 24 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 197; F Koren-
ica and D Doli, ‘No More Unconditional “Mutual Trust” Between the Member States: An Anal-
ysis of the Landmark Decision of the CJEU in Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru’ (2016) 21 EHRLR 542.
10  The Court does so under the preliminary ruling procedure laid down in Article 267 
TFEU. See further, inter alia, M Broberg and N Fenger, Preliminary References to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (2nd edn, OUP 2014).
11  W Van Ballegooij and P Bárd, ‘Mutual Recognition and Individual Rights. Did the Court 
Get it Right?’ (2016) 7 NJEUCL (2016) 439, 462.
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the power of national courts not to entertain European arrest warrants 
on human rights/rule of law related grounds.12 
2 Competing loyalties in a multifaceted legal environment 
2.1 Introduction
When we look at the Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru line of jurisprudence 
through the lenses of national judges, the emerging picture is not even 
close to a nicely balanced Rembrandt but has more of the dottiness 
known from the works of Pollock. It is notable, however, that it may some-
what vary, depending on whether one uses the lenses of a judge sitting 
at a constitutional court or whether at an ordinary criminal court. For 
the fi rst, the challenges emerging from the development of EU criminal 
law, in particular mutual recognition, are comparable to the ones faced 
in other areas of EU law. For decades now, constitutional courts in many 
of the Member States have been engaged in − depending on the perspec-
tive − judicial battles or judicial dialogue with the Court of Justice of 
the European Union regarding the doctrine of supremacy. For reasons 
which merit no explanation, EU criminal law became part of this equa-
tion shortly after the adoption of the Framework Decision on the Euro-
pean Arrest Warrant.13 Prior to that, EC/EU law had largely been terra 
incognita for national criminal courts. 
The years immediately following the entry into force of the Trea-
ty on European Union were marred by uncertainties. Firstly, until the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the suite of legal instruments employed by the Euro-
pean Union in criminal matters was very different from the traditional 
set of regulations and directives used in the former fi rst pillar of the 
EU.14 Secondly, the rules on their enforcement at the national level were 
undefi ned. Thirdly, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice was limited. 
Even after the reform introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Court 
had no jurisdiction to determine the compatibility of national laws with 
EU criminal law. Furthermore, it provided assistance to national courts 
12  Case C-216/18PPU LM ECLI:EU:C:2018:586; Case C-220/18PPU ML ECLI:EU:C:2018:589; 
Case C-327/18PPU RO ECLI:EU:C:2018:733.
13  Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States [2002] OJ L190/1. For an 
academic appraisal see, inter alia, R Blekxtoon and W van Ballegooij (eds), Handbook on 
the European Arrest Warrant (Asser Press 2005); N Keizer and E van Sliedregt (eds), The 
European Arrest Warrant in Practice (Asser Press 2009).
14  See further A Łazowski and B Kurcz, ‘Two Sides of the Same Coin? Framework Decisions 
and Directives Compared’ (2006) 25 YEL 177. See also MJ Borgers, ‘Implementing Frame-
work Decisions (2007) 44 CML Rev 1361; A Hinarejos, On the Legal Effects of Framework 
Decisions and Decisions: Directly Applicable, Directly Effective, Self-Executing, Supreme? 
(2008) 14 ELJ 20.
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qua the preliminary procedure only in the cases of those Member States 
which recognised its jurisdiction.15 The end result was that judges in do-
mestic criminal courts were, whenever in doubt, left partly to their own 
devices. Still, as argued by the present author elsewhere, the Court of 
Justice has managed to put its fi rm mark on the evolving EU criminal 
law.16 This includes the principle of mutual recognition, in particular 
its fl agship instrument − the European arrest warrant. Not only have 
its human rights credentials been challenged several times,17 but many 
aspects of the EAW modus operandi have reached the Kirchberg court-
rooms.18 
In this context, the Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru line of jurisprudence 
seems to have been inevitable, as from the early days of the Frame-
work Decision 584/2001/JHA questions were raised concerning wheth-
er national judges may refuse to surrender on human rights grounds. 
The legal framework was somewhat confused, as the Framework Deci-
sion 584/2001/JHA was not the fi nest hour of the EU legislator and the 
transposition effort by the national parliaments has been of questionable 
quality. The situation was exacerbated by the already mentioned lack of 
infringement proceedings in criminal matters, which − arguably − was 
partly to blame for the incomplete transposition of EU criminal law to 
domestic legal orders.19 
2.2 Thou shalt be my master: who art thou? 
In order to appreciate the complexities of the Aranyosi and Cǎldǎra-
ru line of jurisprudence, it is worth exploring further the competing loy-
alties that national criminal courts face in the highly multifaceted legal 
environment they are operating in. It is a well-known treatise that na-
tional judges in the EU Member States serve at least two masters: the 
domestic and EU legal orders. On the one hand, as per national laws, the 
task of national judges is to enforce domestic law. On the other hand, the 
15  For a comprehensive overview, see, inter alia, A Hinarejos, Judicial Control in the Europe-
an Union. Reforming Jurisdiction in the Intergovernmental Pillars (OUP 2009).
16  A. Łazowski, ‘Stepping into Uncharted Waters No More: The Court of Justice and EU 
Criminal Law’ in Brière and Weyembergh (n 6).
17  Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:261; Case C-396/11 Ciprian Vasile Radu ECLI:EU:C:2013:39.
18  See, eg, Case C-66/08 Proceedings concerning the execution of a European arrest warrant 
issued against Szymon Kozłowski ECLI:EU:C:2008:437; Case C-123/08 Dominic Wolzen-
burg ECLI:EU:C:2009:616; Case C-306/09 IB ECLI:EU:C:2010:626; Case C-237/15PPU 
Minister for Justice and Equality v Francis Lanigan ECLI:EU:C:2015:474.
19  In relation to pre-Lisbon EU legal acts that had been adopted under the Third Pillar of 
the European Union, the infringement proceedings envisaged in Articles 258-260 TFEU 
apply only as of 1 December 2014. See further Łazowski (n 16) 114-118.
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same judges have been mandated by the Court of Justice to guarantee 
the effectiveness of EU law and, by this token, to make sure it is enforced 
at the domestic level. In accordance with the doctrine of primacy, as de-
veloped by the judges at Kirchberg, in cases of confl ict between domestic 
and EU law a national judge is governed by the Simmenthal mandate.20 
Thus, in a given case, it has to set aside the domestic law and give EU 
law priority. This, in itself, is a challenge for the national judiciaries, in 
particular when countries join the European Union. Over the years its 
membership (and that of its predecessor the European Community) has 
grown from the six founding countries to the current twenty-eight.21 This 
has brought under the same umbrella a very diverse group of European 
States with different legal traditions and cultures, as well as different 
attitudes to non-domestic sources of law.22 But the legal environment 
in which national judges operate goes beyond the EU and national legal 
orders. As is well known, all Member States of the European Union are 
also members of the Council of Europe and, by the same token, parties 
to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, as well as subject to scrutiny by the European Court of Human 
Rights. 
Navigating such a multifaceted, and not always consistent, web of 
rules is at times an unenviable task. In an average European arrest 
warrant case, a domestic court, which deals with its execution, will face, 
on the one hand, the domestic Constitution and national rules giving 
effect to the Framework Decision 584/2001/JHA and, on the other hand, 
the Framework Decision 584/2001/JHA itself, as well as the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the ECHR. In this respect, the case of Melloni23 
and Opinion 2/13 on accession to the ECHR24 demonstrate the potential 
complexities rather well. In Melloni, the Court of Justice was asked by 
the Spanish Constitutional Court whether the domestic constitutional 
20  See, inter alia, B de Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Primacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order, in P 
Craig and G de Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011); D Leczykiewicz, ‘Effec-
tiveness of EU Law before National Courts: Direct Effect, Effective Judicial Protection, and 
State Liability’ in A Arnull and D Chalmers, The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law 
(OUP 2015); A Capik, ‘Five Decades since Van Gend en Loos and Costa Came to Town: Pri-
macy, Direct and Indirect Effect Revisited’ in A Łazowski and S Blockmans (eds), Research 
Handbook on EU Institutional Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016).
21  It is notable that the European Union is expected to experience the fi rst reduction of its 
membership when the United Kingdom leaves on 29 March 2019. 
22  See, inter alia, A Łazowski (ed), The Application of EU Law in the New Member States. 
Brave New World (Asser Press 2010); M Bobek (ed), Central European Judges Under the 
European Infl uence. The Transformative Power of the EU Revisited (Hart Publishing 2015).
23  Case C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal ECLI:EU:C:2013:107. 
24  Opinion 2/13 of the Court of 18 December 2014: Accession by the Union to the Eu-
ropean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
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standard of human rights protection should prevail over the Framework 
Decision on the European Arrest Warrant. The answer of the Court of 
Justice was controversial, to say the least.25 The Court held that while 
the Framework Decision 584/2001/JHA complied with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, the Spanish courts could not apply a higher stan-
dard of human rights protection developed on the basis of the Spanish 
Constitution. Arguably, the Court of Justice seems to have sacrifi ced 
justice on the altar of security, but that must have been for a reason: the 
judges at Kirchberg feared that to rule otherwise would undermine the 
effectiveness of mutual recognition or, more broadly, EU law. This was 
confi rmed a few years later in Opinion 2/13, in which the Court of Jus-
tice rejected the possibility of accession to the ECHR under the terms of 
the negotiated Accession Agreement.26 One of the main reasons behind 
the Court’s decision was protection of mutual recognition in criminal 
matters.
For criminal courts, the jurisprudence on the enforcement of frame-
work decisions was of equal importance. It was clear from the start that 
they cannot produce direct effect as the former Article 34 TEU was un-
equivocal in this respect. However, the subsequent jurisprudence of the 
Court extended the application of the doctrine of indirect effect to frame-
work decisions. The starting point was Case C-105/03 Pupino,27 while the 
25  It obviously attracted a fl urry of academic commentary. See, inter alia, A Tinsley, ‘Note 
on the Reference in Case C-399/11 Melloni’ (2012) 3 NJECL 19; N De Boer, ‘Addressing 
Rights Divergence under the Charter: Melloni’ (2013) 50 CML Rev. 1083; M. De Visser, 
‘Dealing with Divergences in Fundamental Rights Standards’ (2013) MJECL 576; A Pliakos 
and G Anagnostaras, ‘Fundamental Rights and the New Battle over Legal and Judicial Su-
premacy: Lessons from Melloni’ (2015) 34 YEL 97; G Cavallone, ‘European Arrest Warrant 
and Fundamental Rights in Decisions Rendered in Absentia: The Extent of Union Law in the 
Case C-399/11 Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal’ (2014) ECLR 19; LFM Besselink, ‘The Parame-
ters of Constitutional Confl ict after Melloni’ (2014) EL Rev 531; J Vervaele, ‘The European 
Arrest Warrant and Applicable Standards of Fundamental Rights in the EU’ (2013) Review 
of European Administrative Law 37.
26  For an academic appraisal see, inter alia, D Halberstam, ‘“It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!” 
A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward’ 
(2015) 16 GLJ 105; C Krenn, ‘Autonomy and Effectiveness as Common Concerns: A Path to 
ECHR Accession after Opinion 2/13’ (2015) 16 GLJ 147; S Øby Johansen, ‘The Reinterpre-
tation of TFEU Article 344 in Opinion 2/13 and its Potential Consequences’ (2015) 16 GLJ 
169; A Łazowski and RA Wessel, ‘When Caveats Turn into Locks: Opinion 2/13 on Acces-
sion of the European Union to the ECHR’ (2015) 16 GLJ 179; S Peers, ‘The EU’s Accession 
to the ECHR: The Dream Becomes a Nightmare’ (2015) 16 GLJ 213; P Eeckhout, ‘Opinion 
2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue: Autonomy or Autarky’ (2015) 
38 Fordham Intl LJ (2015)  955; B de Witte and © ImamoviÊ, ‘Opinion 2/13 on Accession 
to the ECHR: Defending the EU Legal Order against a Foreign Human Rights Court’ (2015) 
40 EL Rev 683; BH Pirker and S Reitemeyer, ‘Between Discursive and Exclusive Autonomy: 
Opinion 2/13, the Protection of Fundamental Rights and the Autonomy of EU Law’ (2015) 
17 CYELS 168.
27  Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino ECLI:EU:C:2005:386. For 
an academic appraisal see, inter alia, M Fletcher, ‘Extending “indirect effect” to the Third 
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judgments in Cases C-42/11 Da Silva Jorge28 and C-579/15 Popławski29 
provided further guidance to national judges. But the question is wheth-
er the answers of the Court of Justice have made the tasks of national 
judges clearer or, on the contrary, if they have led to confusion. For in-
stance, in Case C-579/15 Popławski the Court of Justice held:
the fact remains that the principle that national law must be interpret-
ed in conformity with EU law requires national courts to do whatever 
lies within their jurisdiction, taking the whole body of domestic law into 
consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by 
it, with a view to ensuring that the framework decision in question is 
fully effective and to achieving an outcome consistent with the objective 
pursued by it.30
In theoretical terms such a conclusion is plausible but for many 
domestic judges it might be diffi cult to square the circle in a courtroom. 
In the case of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant, 
the challenges are exacerbated by the fact that, as already mentioned 
above, the domestic provisions of many Member States do not faithfully 
mirror the EU legislation in question. For instance, the national legis-
lators were quite economical with the transposition of the grounds for 
refusal to surrender laid down in Article 4 of the Framework Decision.31 
Furthermore, some Member States have included the human rights 
grounds even though they are neither mentioned on the list of obligatory 
grounds or optional grounds for refusal to surrender. Yet, at the same 
time, as per Article 1(3) EAW FD, the legislation in question does not 
modify the obligation to respect the fundamental rights and principles 
outlined in Article 6 TEU. Does it mean that this is yet another ground 
for refusal to surrender and, if so, to which category does it belong (com-
pulsory or discretionary)? Furthermore, recitals 12 and 13 of the Pream-
ble give an indication that domestic courts should not surrender individ-
Pillar: The Signifi cance of Pupino?’ (2005) 30 EL Rev 862; E Spaventa, ‘Opening Pandora’s 
Box: Some Refl ections on the Constitutional Effects of the Decision in Pupino’ (2007) 3 
EuConst 5.
28  Case C-42/11 Proceedings concerning the execution of a European arrest warrant issued 
against Joã o Pedro Lopes Da Silva Jorge ECLI:EU:C:2012:517. For an academic appraisal 
see, inter alia, Ch Janssens, ‘Differentiation on the Basis of Nationality in Surrender Cases: 
The Court of Justice Clarifi es in Case C-42/11 Lopes Da Silva Jorge the Member States’ 
Margin of Discretion’ (2013) 19 CJEL (2013) 553.
29  Case C-579/15 Openbaar Ministerie against Daniel Adam Popławski ECLI:EU:C:2017:116.
30  ibid, para 34. 
31  See Commission, ‘Report based on Article 34 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 
June 2002 on the European Arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member 
States’ COM (2005) 63 fi nal; ‘Report based on Article 34 of the Council Framework Decision 
of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 
Member States (revised version)’ COM (2006) 8 fi nal.
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uals on several human rights related grounds. This is an example of a 
legal cacophony, which demonstrates a number of important phenomena 
mentioned earlier in the present contribution. Firstly, it proves that the 
Framework Decision in question was not the fi nest hour of the EU leg-
islator. It was rushed in the post-9/11 political climate and subject to 
unanimous approval of the Council. Big compromises usually come at a 
price, and the Framework Decision in question is fi tting evidence of this. 
Secondly, it also exemplifi es the quagmires of competing loyalties that 
domestic judges are exposed to. On the one hand, they have the domestic 
Constitutions and legislation on the EAW to apply. On the other hand, 
as per the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, the interpretation of 
the latter should take into account the Framework Decision 584/2001/
JHA, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, as well as the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. Last but not least, the domestic courts also have 
to comply with the ECHR and, for instance, the right to a fair trial laid 
down therein. It is against this background that one should look at the 
Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru line of cases. 
3 Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru and follow-up 
3.1 Introduction
The Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru case was no doubt a turning point. 
Prior to the judgment of the Court of Justice, several national courts re-
fused to surrender individuals on human rights grounds. Furthermore, 
the German Constitutional Court conducted its Constitutional identity 
review, whereby it sent strong signals into the legal stratosphere.32 Inevi-
tably, the matter in question eventually reached the Court of Justice qua 
the preliminary ruling procedure.33 As is frequently the case with land-
mark and groundbreaking judgments of the Court, further references 
from national courts followed. Cases C-216/18PPU LM,34 C-220/18PPU 
ML,35 and C-327/18PPU RO36 are presented in turn. 
32  Order of 15 December 2015, 2 BvR 2735/14. For an academic appraisal see, inter alia, 
F Meyer, ‘“From Solange II to Forever I”: The German Federal Constitutional Court and the 
European Arrest Warrant (and How the CJEU Responded)’ (2016) 7 NJECL 277; M Hong, 
‘Human Dignity, Identity Review of the European Arrest Warrant and the Court of Justice 
as a Listener in the Dialogue of Courts: Solange-III and Aranyosi: BVerfG 15 December 
2015, 2 BvR 2735/14, Solange III, and ECJ (Grand Chamber) 5 April 2016, joined cases 
C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru’ (2016) 12 EUConst 549.
33  In the early case law, see Case C-396/11 Ciprian Vasile Radu ECLI:EU:C:2013:39 and, 
especially, Case C-396/11 Ministerul Public − Parchetul de pe lângǎ Curtea de Apel Con-
stanţa v Ciprian Vasile Radu ECLI:EU:C:2012:648, Opinion of AG Sharpston.
34  Case C-216/18PPU LM ECLI:EU:C:2018:586.
35  Case C-220/18PPU ML ECLI:EU:C:2018:589.
36  Case C-327/18PPU RO ECLI:EU:C:2018:733.
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3.2  Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru: can we trust your detention 
conditions?
3.2.1 Introduction
For the domestic courts, the judgment in Joined Cases Aranyosi and 
Cǎldǎraru offers a very much overdue clarifi cation of how national judg-
es should proceed when faced with argumentation and evidence prov-
ing that at the receiving end the person being subject to an EAW may 
be exposed to inhuman treatment at a detention facility or facilities.37 
The Court has ruled that even though the system is based on the pre-
sumption of mutual trust and mutual recognition, in extraordinary cir-
cumstances, and subject to a number of preliminary procedural steps, a 
domestic court may decide to bring the surrender procedure to an end.38 
This is not, however, by any stretch of the imagination, a straightforward 
affair. From the point of view of national judges, at least three aspects of 
this decision are problematic and merit attention in this article. 
To begin with, the already mentioned legal quagmire of the rela-
tionship between Articles 3-4a (grounds for refusal to surrender), Article 
1(3) (fundamental rights) of the EAW Framework Decision, and Article 4 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights comes to the fore. The key ques-
tion is: do we now have an additional ground for refusal to surrender? 
If so, why were fundamental rights not included either in the catalogue 
of mandatory grounds or in the list of discretionary grounds, as good 
law-making principles would dictate? It is very instructive to look how 
the Court of Justice framed this issue and what it means for national 
authorities in charge of executing European arrest warrants. Second-
ly, the procedural modus operandi developed by the Court of Justice is 
plausible at fi rst sight. When in doubt, the national court should fi rst 
make a general determination of the situation on receipt of the request 
and, should it be necessary, also seek a clarifi cation from its counterpart 
in the requesting country. The key questions, however, are what kind of 
information may be used in the fi rst instance, and, in turn, what sort 
of clarifi cation may be requested from a counterpart in another Member 
State and how comprehensive should it be? Thirdly, under what circum-
stances can the national court refuse to surrender, or, as euphemistical-
ly put by the Court of Justice, under what circumstances may it bring 
the surrender procedure to an end?
37  See, inter alia, A Łazowski and S Nash, ‘Detention’ in N Keijzer and E van Sliedregt (eds), 
The European Arrest Warrant in Practice (TMC Asser Press/CUP 2009).
38  Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru (n 9) para 104.
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3.2.2. Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru: a new ground for the non-execution of a 
European arrest warrant?
The substantive part of the judgment starts, as one would expect, 
with a truncated exposé covering the foundations of mutual recognition 
in criminal matters. The picture drawn by the judges at Kirchberg seems 
to be clear: the system is based on mutual trust, and benefi ts from the 
presumption that the Member States provide ‘equivalent and effective 
protection of the fundamental right recognized at EU level, particularly 
in the Charter’.39 The trouble starts if one reads paragraph 80 of the judg-
ment literally. The Court emphasises that an authority which executes 
a European arrest warrant may refuse to do so on the grounds ‘exhaus-
tively listed’ in Articles 3 and 4-4a of Framework Decision 584/2002/
JHA. The choice of words employed by the Court of Justice makes it 
perfectly clear that the list of grounds is exhaustive. To put it differently, 
it is the limit. If such a reading were to be correct, it would mean that na-
tional authorities may not, at least as per the EAW Framework Decision, 
refuse to surrender on human rights grounds. Then, however, the Court 
of Justice veers away from the Framework Decision itself and continues 
its analysis by putting the centre of gravity on Article 4 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights.40 In this respect, Article 1(3) of the Framework 
Decision serves as the bridge between these legal acts. It provides that 
the EAW Framework Decision does not modify the obligation to respect 
fundamental rights enshrined in Article 6 TEU. This, as clarifi ed by the 
Court of Justice in the commented case, also comprises the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. The judges confi rm, in turn, that the Charter 
applies to the case at hand, as the application of national provisions 
transposing the EAW Framework Decision constitutes implementation 
of EU law, which − as per Article 51(1) − is a conditio sine qua non for the 
application of the Charter.41 For a national judge, confusion may arise 
from a comparative analysis of the interpretation of Article 1(3) of the 
EAW Framework Decision by Advocate General Bot and the conclusions 
of the Court.42 Arguably, it is one of those examples where it would have 
served national judges if the Court of Justice openly agreed or disagreed 
with its own advocate general.43 While Advocate General Bot claimed 
39  ibid, para 77. 
40  For an academic appraisal of Art 4 of the Charter see, inter alia, M Nowak and A Char-
bord, ‘Article 4’ in S Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. A Com-
mentary (Hart/Beck 2014).
41  See further, inter alia, A Ward, ‘Article 51’ in Peers (n 40).
42  See also Case C-396/11 Ministerul Public − Parchetul de pe lângǎ Curtea de Apel Con-
stanţa v Ciprian Vasile Radu, ECLI:EU:C:2012:648, Opinion of AG Sharpston.
43  For an academic appraisal of advocates general and their role at the Court of Justice see, 
eg, N Burrows and R Graves, The Advocate General and EC Law (OUP 2007). 
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that the provision in question may not serve as a ground for refusal to 
surrender, the Court of Justice used it as a vehicle to a conclusion, which 
offers a mixed bag of legal bases. The judges’ fi nal conclusion is based 
on Articles 1(3), 5 and 6(1) of the EAW Framework Decision. It is notable 
that Articles 3, 4 and 4a covering grounds for the non-execution of the 
European arrest warrant are nowhere to be seen. This, as argued later, 
may have been the reason behind the very cautious wording employed 
by the Court of Justice to describe options available to a national court 
should its doubts not be discounted after clarifi cations from the request-
ing country.
3.2.3 Towards a creative interpretation of the EAW Framework Decision
Voltaire acutely observed that ‘doubt is an uncomfortable condi-
tion’.44 It is particularly so when a national judge doubts the respect for 
fundamental rights in the requesting country and considers whether or 
not to surrender an individual. Arguably, the references in the Joint Case 
Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru also put the Court of Justice in an uncomfort-
able position as it forced the judges to engage in the balancing act of rec-
onciling mutual trust and mutual recognition with the risks to respect-
ing fundamental rights. At this stage of the analysis, it is fi tting to focus 
on how the Court of Justice interpreted the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and the way it designed a procedure for national judges to follow 
when they fi nd themselves in the same predicament as Hanseatisches 
Oberlandesgericht in Bremen (from which both references originated). 
To begin with, the Court of Justice emphasised that when national 
authorities deal with the execution of a European arrest warrant, they 
need to take into account Article 4 of the Charter, which prohibits inhu-
man and degrading treatment or punishment.45 Since it is modelled on 
Article 3 ECHR, it has to be interpreted accordingly, that is, taking into 
account the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.46 
The question that emerged in Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru is how to square 
the circle, taking into account the Framework Decision 584/2002/JHA 
and Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. To put it differently, 
how a national judge should proceed when, on the one hand, Articles 
3-4/4a of the Framework Decision provide for an exhaustive catalogue 
of grounds for refusal to surrender and yet, on the other hand, such a 
surrender may not expose the person concerned to inhuman and de-
grading treatment. In this respect the Court of Justice has proven to be 
44  Voltaire, The Complete Works of Voltaire (Voltaire Foundation, online edition, nd).
45  For an academic appraisal see, inter alia, M Nowak and A Charbord, ‘Article 4’ in Peers 
(n 40).
46  As per Article 52 of the Charter.
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quite creative, developing a two-tier test that should be followed. As will 
be argued below, this provides some clarity as a matter of principle, but, 
at the same time, a fair degree of uncertainty when it comes to national 
courtrooms.
As a fi rst step, the executing judicial authority must establish 
whether there is a risk of degrading treatment in the detention condi-
tions in the receiving country. Such argumentation with evidence is like-
ly to be submitted by defence lawyers aiming at the non-surrender of 
their clients. The question is what kind of evidence must be submitted 
to prove the point. In this respect, paragraph 89 of the judgment is very 
instrumental. The Court of Justice ruled that:
the executing judicial authority must, initially, rely on information that 
is objective, reliable, specifi c and properly updated on the detention 
conditions prevailing in the issuing Member State and that demon-
strates that there are defi ciencies, which may be systemic or general-
ised, or which may affect certain groups of people, or which may affect 
certain places of detention.47
The test is not only about the categories and quality of information 
that will be employed to make the assessment but also about the sub-
stantive criteria to be used to determine what is specifi c enough. In this 
respect the following paragraph of the judgment is crucial as the Court 
of Justice elaborates further on the detention standards developed in its 
jurisprudence by the European Court of Human Rights. It held: 
it follows from the case-law of the ECtHR that Article 3 ECHR impos-
es, on the authorities of the State on whose territory an individual is 
detained, a positive obligation to ensure that any prisoner is detained 
in conditions which guarantee respect for human dignity, that the way 
in which detention is enforced does not cause the individual concerned 
distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of 
suffering that is inherent in detention and that, having regard to the 
practical requirements of imprisonment, the health and well-being of 
the prisoner are adequately protected (see judgment of the ECtHR in 
Torreggiani and Others v. Italy […].48
All the above is plausible as far as the principles are concerned. Yet, 
when one looks at it through the lenses of national judges several ques-
tions emerge. While it is true that it gives the domestic courts discretion 
and fl exibility, at the same time it merely provides vague indications 
and puts the uniform application of EU law at risk. Firstly, the test laid 
down in paragraph 89 of the judgment is characterised by rather vague 
47  Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru (n 9) para 89.
48  ibid, para 90.
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wording. The adjectives employed by the Court of Justice are quite open 
ended. The test requires a national judge to base the assessment on data, 
which is: ‘objective, reliable, specifi c and properly updated’. The fi rst 
three notions are largely linked to the source and quality of information, 
where the assessment of a national judge will be rather subjective. The 
fourth criterion requires a more objective evaluation and, thus, remains 
the easiest in this set. In practical terms, the key dilemma that domestic 
judges face is whom to trust. To put it differently, which sources may be 
treated as trustworthy, so as to guarantee that the information meets 
the discussed requirements? The Court of Justice, seemingly aware of 
the matter in question, indicated that judgments of international courts 
as well as national courts may be taken into account. This, obviously, 
includes the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Fur-
thermore, documents produced by the Council of Europe or UN related 
authorities will also serve the purpose. The reports of the Committee for 
the Prevention of Torture, operating within the Council of Europe, can 
surely be of use. It should be noted, however, that the list laid down in 
para 89 of the judgment is non-exhaustive. Hence, it is for national judg-
es to make a selection of sources of information when acting ex offi cio 
and to decide what kind of material submitted by defence lawyers should 
be treated as credible. It leaves it open whether sources coming from 
NGOs, local or international, should be considered by national judges as 
‘objective’ and ‘reliable’. 
From the academic point of view, one may conclude that the Court of 
Justice struck a balance between providing assistance to national courts 
and leaving them a solid margin of discretion. In reality, however, the 
conclusions of the Court are based on a rather optimistic presumption 
that national judges are au courant, for instance with the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights or the outputs of such outlets 
as already mentioned, including the Committee for the Prevention of Tor-
ture. It is also based on the presumption that national judges and their 
clerks are fl uent in foreign languages. This is particularly relevant for the 
matter at hand, as the language regime of the Council of Europe is rather 
modest when compared to that of the European Union. To put it differ-
ently, judgments or reports are not − as a rule − translated en masse into 
the languages of all members of Council of Europe. A reminder is fi tting 
that the EAW proceedings are subject to a very tight time regime, leaving 
very little space for translation. 
As already mentioned, the Court of Justice requires the information 
to be ‘specifi c’, which − again − may be considered as problematic. A 
simple question emerges as to what is specifi c enough to satisfy the test. 
Would the level of detail required by a national judge depend on a par-
ticular requesting country? For instance, should the level of detail cor-
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respond to the level of trust in the judiciary, law enforcement apparatus 
and detention conditions in the requesting country? To put it differently, 
should less trust translate into a higher level of detail required to meet 
the test? It has been left to national practice to decide. 
Once the ‘objective, reliable, specifi c and properly updated [informa-
tion] on detention conditions’ is collected, the executing authority needs 
to determine whether there is ‘a real risk of inhuman or degrading treat-
ment by virtue of general conditions of detention in the issuing Member 
State’. If there is no such risk, then the domestic authority has to pro-
ceed with the execution of the European arrest warrant (providing there 
are no other grounds for refusal to surrender). If, however, systemic or 
generalised defi ciencies exist, their existence is not per se an indication 
that a person, whose is the subject of a European arrest warrant, will be 
exposed to treatment that would be in breach of Article 4 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. This needs to be determined by the executing 
authority separately by liaising with its counterparts in the requesting 
country. For this purpose, the procedural mechanism laid down in Arti-
cle 15(2) of the EAW Framework Decision should be employed. The Court 
of Justice clarifi ed, in a very general fashion, that the evidence obtained 
must, again, be ‘objective, reliable, specifi c and properly updated’ in or-
der to verify if there are ‘substantial grounds’ to believe that the person 
in question ‘will run a real risk’ of being subject to inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment.49 It may include information about the modi operandi for 
monitoring the detention conditions. However, all other details are left to 
the decision of national judges, which − in itself − opens a host of prob-
lems and challenges. For instance, how detailed should such a request 
for supplementary information be and should the national court of the 
requesting country be trusted blindly? Not surprisingly, the matters in 
question have returned to the Court of Justice like a boomerang in the 
cases discussed later in the present article. 
Once all necessary general and individualised information is in 
place, it is for the national executing authority to decide whether to sur-
render the person in question or not. In this respect, the Court of Justice 
has provided general guidance on how the domestic judges should pro-
ceed. Should the conclusion be that there is a ‘real risk of inhuman or 
degrading treatment’ the execution of the European arrest warrant must 
be postponed. However, as the Court of Justice phrased it, the execution 
‘cannot be abandoned’.50 On the one hand, the postponement of surren-
der gives the executing authority a chance to seek further clarifi cation 
from the requesting court, and, for the latter, one more opportunity to 
49  ibid, para 94. 
50  ibid, para 98. 
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discount the doubts as to the existence of risk of inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment of the person subject to the European arrest warrant. On 
the other hand, the solution preferred by the Court of Justice triggers 
numerous challenges for the national courts related to, for instance, de-
tention of the person concerned during the period of suspension. Fur-
thermore, it is entirely unclear how long such a suspension should last. 
The Court of Justice has only provided an indication that the time period 
should be ‘reasonable’.51 This is a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, 
it affords national judges discretion but, on the other hand, it painfully 
lacks detail and offers limited guidance, especially given that in the next 
step a national court may take its fi nal decision to refuse to surrender. 
As already mentioned, the Court of Justice has confi rmed its earlier 
jurisprudence in the Joined Cases Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru that limita-
tions of the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust are on the 
menu, although only in exceptional circumstances. As the commented 
judgment clarifi es, such exceptional circumstances may occur when the 
national court in charge of the execution of a European arrest warrant 
cannot discount doubts as to the risk of inhuman or degrading treat-
ment that a person subject to an EAW may face. Should that be the case, 
the domestic judges may bring the procedure to an end. The already 
mentioned euphemistic language employed by the Court is a departure 
from the statutory vocabulary used by the EU legislator in the EAW 
Framework Decision. The reasons behind the decision not to call a spade 
a spade will remain locked behind the doors of the deliberation room at 
Kirchberg. It is, however, worth emphasising that the Court of Justice 
deliberately talks about bringing the procedure to an end, instead of re-
fusal to surrender. Perhaps this is related to the fact that neither Article 
3 nor Articles 4-4a of the EAW Framework Decision (which deal with the 
grounds for the non-execution of the surrender requests) are mentioned 
in the fi nal conclusions of the Court. Does this mean that the Court has 
developed a parallel modus operandi on top of the existing grounds for 
non-execution? Alas, this is not clear from the judgment at hand.
3.2.4. Conclusions 
Overall, the judgment in the Joined Cases Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru 
prompts − not surprisingly − mixed emotions. On the one hand, it offers 
a long overdue clarifi cation, and, in a way, it brings the EU acquis into 
synchronisation with domestic practice in some of the Member States. 
Furthermore, it eases the mentioned loyalty confl icts which face the na-
tional judges in such cases. As argued earlier, while providing a clarifi ca-
51 ibid, para 104.
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tion, this judgment also triggers a host of new challenges and questions 
for national judges. Not surprisingly, some of them have found their way 
to the Court of Justice qua subsequent references for a preliminary rul-
ing, which are analysed below in turn. 
3.3  Case C-220/18PPU ML: can we really trust your detention 
conditions?
3.3.1 Introduction
Case C-220/18PPU ML is surely a follow-up to Joined Cases C-404/15 
and C-659/15PPU Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru and proves the point made by 
W Van Ballegooij and P Bárd that the latter case was just the beginning 
of the dialogue between national courts and the Court of Justice.52 The 
judgment in case ML also fi ts into a more general trend that whenever 
the Court of Justice delivers a ground-breaking judgment setting a prin-
ciple, it frequently shies away from giving it a satisfactory level of detail.53 
Consequently, domestic courts follow with further references, seeking a 
clarifi cation of the earlier jurisprudential output.54 The ML case is ideal 
to demonstrate the phenomenon in question and, no doubt, further ref-
erences are due to follow. For the purposes of the analysis that follows, it 
is enough to provide a reminder that the gist of the reference was centred 
on two main issues.55 Firstly, whether the Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru test 
requires verifi cation of information regarding all detention conditions 
in the receiving countries or, alternatively, only those detention centres 
where the person covered by the European arrest warrant is likely to 
be transferred. Secondly, the question was how detailed the request for 
information should be. As explained earlier in the present article, on the 
one hand the judgment in Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru gives the national 
authorities discretion to determine what kind of information is specifi c 
enough to meet the test. On the other hand, a question emerges regard-
ing whether there are limits to the discretion. Arguably, the latter may 
52  van Ballegooij and Bárd (n 11) 462.
53  Many a time it is a consequence of the way in which the Court of Justice operates. As 
frequently discussed in the academic literature, the rules governing the functioning of the 
Court of Justice do not permit for dissenting opinions; therefore, the judgments, as well 
as opinions or orders of the Court, are products of compromises between judges forming a 
particular chamber. Allegedly, this may have an impact on the quality of judicial discourse 
and, by the same token, the judgments of the Court. See further, inter alia, M Adams and 
others (eds), Judging Europe’s Judges: The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court 
of Justice (Hart Publishing 2013).
54  In this respect, a good example is the judgment in Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano 
v Offi ce national de l’emploi (ONEm) ECLI:EU:C:2011:124.
55  It is notable that the referring court submitted over a page of questions to the Court of 
Justice. See para 40 of the judgment.
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be inextricably linked to the level of trust in the judicial system at the 
receiving end. To put it differently, the less trust, the more information 
may be required and information that is considered to be desirably spe-
cifi c. It could, of course, also work the other way around: the more trust, 
the less information is required.
3.3.2 How deep is your trust?
In Case C-220/18PPU ML, the levels of trust in the Hungarian de-
tention centres were, perhaps, not particularly impressive. This was 
hardly surprising bearing in mind the evidence available to the refer-
ring court, comprising, inter alia, judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights.56 Yet, when looking at the requests for clarifi cation sub-
mitted to the Hungarian authorities, it may well be that the case was 
handled by overzealous judges, who wished to know as much as possible 
about the Hungarian detention facilities. Either way, the Court of Justice 
was asked for clarifi cation of the judgment in Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru. 
The preliminary observations made by the judges at Kirchberg offer the 
domestic judges, including the referring court, nothing new. The Court 
of Justice has provided a systemic background of the principles of mutu-
al trust and mutual recognition, which is well known from its previous 
jurisprudence.57 However, the parts of the reasoning that follow are un-
doubtedly very useful from the perspective of national judges. 
To begin with, the Court of Justice attended to the relevance of a 
new legal remedy available as per Hungarian law to challenge the legality 
of detention conditions. The judges clarifi ed that the existence of such 
a remedy may not, per se, rule out the risk of inhuman and degrading 
treatment at detention centres. By the same token, it does not free the 
executing judicial authority from the obligation to conduct the gener-
al assessment required by the Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru test. The Court 
in turn proceeded to clarify how much information may be required as 
supplementary clarifi cation by the executing authority. It is notable that 
in the case at hand the German authorities sent a total of 78 questions 
to their Hungarian counterparts. This, as argued earlier, may be evi-
dence of limited trust combined, perhaps, with a pinch of overzealous-
ness. Nevertheless, it allowed the Court of Justice to provide a necessary 
clarifi cation of its earlier ruling in Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru. Firstly, the 
56  For instance, the judgment of the ECtHR of 10 March 2015, Varga and Others v Hungary 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2015:0310JUD001409712, paras 79-92.
57  The only exception is paras 68-71 where the Court of Justice reacts to submissions of 
the Hungarian government, disputing the existence of defi ciencies in Hungarian detention 
centres. The Court of Justice, and rightly so, concludes that the existence of such defi cien-
cies is not the subject of the reference for a preliminary ruling, and neither is a determina-
tion of their existence a task for the Court of Justice. 
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executing judicial authority should make enquiries only related to the 
detention conditions in prisons where the person subject to a European 
arrest warrant may be detained. This includes units where the surren-
dered person will be detained on a temporary or transitional basis. This 
precludes general requests covering all national prisons. Secondly, only 
conditions of detention which are relevant for the determination of a real 
risk of inhuman or degrading treatment should be enquired about and 
used for the assessment. In this respect, the Court of Justice has relied 
− as indicators − on relevant standards developed by the European Court 
of Human Rights.58 Bearing in mind the lack of relevant EU standards, 
this is the most obvious choice, which − among others − provides do-
mestic judges with a useful clarifi cation of interaction between EU law 
and ECHR standards. By the same token, it helps them to navigate the 
multifaceted legal environment they are exposed to. 
3.4 Case C-216/18PPU LM: errrm… are you independent enough 
for us to trust you?
3.4.1 Introduction 
Case C-216/18PPU LM was delivered against the very precarious 
political background of a Member State which had downgraded its rule of 
law standards in a staggering anti-democratic blitz. Ever since the elec-
tions in 2015 the Polish Government, the Parliament and the President, 
driven by the right-wing nationalist Prawo i SprawiedliwoπÊ (Law and 
Justice, sic!), have implemented a series of reforms which largely de-ac-
tivated the country’s Constitutional Tribunal and heavily undermined 
the independence of the entire judiciary, including most recently the Su-
preme Court.59 In other words, the reforms have considerably blurred the 
boundaries between the executive and the judiciary, raising the funda-
mental question of whether Poland was still meeting the standard laid 
down in Article 2 TEU. Not surprisingly, this attracted the attention of 
several international actors60 and sounded the alarm bells around the 
58  See ML (n 35) paras 90-100. 
59  For an overview see, inter alia, Filipek (n 8). 
60  For instance, the Commission for Democracy through Law of the Council of Europe 
(usually referred to as the Venice Commission) issued several critical reports about the re-
forms in Poland. See, inter alia, Poland: Opinion on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, 
adopted by the Venice Commission at its 108th Plenary Session (Venice, 14-15 October 
2016) <www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2016)026-e> accessed 23 
December 2018; Poland: Opinion on the Draft Act amending the Act on the National Coun-
cil of the Judiciary; on the Draft Act amending the Act on the Supreme Court, proposed by 
the President of Poland, and on the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, adopted 
by the Commission at its 113th Plenary Session (Venice, 8-9 December 2017) available at 
<www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2017)031-e> accessed 23 De-
cember 2018.
20 Adam Łazowski: The Sky Is Not the Limit: Mutual Trust and Mutual Recognition après...
European Union. Alas, it has also raised questions whether the existing 
modi operandi employed by the European Union to remedy breaches of 
EU law by the Member States are fi t for purpose and whether they can 
be utilised when the rule of law is at stake.61 
When this article was completed, the European Commission was 
at the stage of testing the waters on whether the standard infringement 
proceedings based on Article 258 TFEU could be invoked. It has already 
submitted two infractions to the Court of Justice where it openly chal-
lenged the compatibility of the changes in the Polish law with, among 
others, Article 19 TEU.62 At the same time, it has triggered the par excel-
lence political procedure based on Article 7 TEU.63 In so doing, the Euro-
pean Commission identifi ed several threats to respect for the EU values 
laid down in Article 2 TEU and, as for the procedural requirements laid 
down in Article 7(1) TEU, it issued a reasoned proposal.64 Furthermore, 
several Polish courts, including the Supreme Court, have proceeded with 
references for a preliminary ruling aiming for a clarifi cation on whether 
the alleged reforms, which led to a purge in the judiciary, were compati-
ble with EU law.65 Not surprisingly, questions were also raised in nation-
al courts across the European Union whether the Polish judicial system 
should continue to benefi t from the principles of mutual trust and mu-
tual recognition. This matter, too, reached the Kirchberg courtroom in 
Case C-216/18PPU LM. 
3.4.2 The quagmires of the High Court of Ireland
The reference in case C-216/18PPU LM was submitted by the High 
Court of Ireland, which received a number of European arrest warrants 
issued by the Polish authorities with a view to conducting the criminal 
prosecution of a Polish national who was accused of drug traffi cking. It 
61  See, inter alia, D Kochenov and L Pech, ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of 
Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality’ (2012) 11 EUConst 512; D Kochenov, ‘On Policing 
Article 2 TEU Compliance - Reverse Solange and Systemic Infringements Analyzed’ (2013) 
33 PoLYBIL 145; A Von Bogdandy and others, ‘Reverse Solange: Protecting the Essence of 
Fundamental Rights against EU Member States’ (2012) 49 CML Rev 489; M Schmidt and P 
Bogdanowicz, ‘The Infringement Procedure in the Rule of Law Crisis: How to Make Effective 
Use of Article 258 TFEU’ (2018) 55 CML Rev 1061.
62  For instance, pending case C-619/18 Commission v Poland. See Order of the Vice-pres-
ident of the Court of Justice Case C-619/18P Commission v Poland ECLI:EU:C:2018:852.
63  For an appraisal of Article 7 TEU and its progeny, see, eg, W Sadurski, ‘Adding Bite to a 
Bark: The Story of Article 7, EU Enlargement, and Jörg Haider’ (2010) 16 CJEL 385.
64  Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the determination of a clear risk of a 
serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law’ COM (2017) 835 fi nal.
65  See, inter alia, pending references for a preliminary ruling submitted by the Polish Su-
preme Court: Case C-522/18 DŚ v Zakładowi Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w Jaśle; 
Case C-537/18 Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa; Case C-585/18 Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa.
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should be noted that at the material time the already mentioned Arti-
cle 7 TEU procedure had already been triggered by the European Com-
mission and its recommendations made available to the public. Bearing 
this in mind, the referring court faced the dilemma whether to clear the 
surrender of the person in question to Poland or, alternatively, whether 
to refuse to do so, taking into account the fact that Polish courts were 
no longer independent. The latter, potentially, could expose the person 
surrendered to an unfair trial. Not surprisingly, the High Court of Ire-
land proceeded with a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of 
Justice. The referring court not only analysed in extenso the situation in 
Poland but also questioned whether the Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru modus 
operandi was fi t for purpose in the case at hand. According to the High 
Court of Ireland, it was questionable whether any clarifi cation received 
from the requesting judicial authority should be treated as acceptable. To 
put it differently, would assurances of independence issued by a national 
court that is not independent, discount the doubts of a court asked to en-
tertain a request for surrender?66 Not surprisingly, the Court of Justice 
decided to employ the urgent preliminary ruling procedure and, bearing 
in mind the gravity of the situation and importance of the legal issues 
raised, the case was assigned to the Grand Chamber. 
3.4.3 Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru revisited
The judgment rendered by the Court of Justice raises a plethora of 
legal issues, and merits a comprehensive analysis. This, no doubt, is like-
ly to follow in the academic literature.67 The present article, as outlined 
above, aims to look at the Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru line of jurisprudence 
through the lenses of national judges. Hence, the analysis that follows 
focuses only on selected legal issues raised by the judges at Kirchberg. 
To begin with, the Court of Justice made an attempt to draw a line 
between the Article 7 TEU proceedings and the EAW Framework De-
cision. A reminder is fi tting that the latter provides, albeit only in the 
preamble, that the European Council may suspend the application of 
the European arrest warrant machinery only in cases of serious and 
66  The Irish High Court, Minister for Justice and Equality v Celmer (No 1) judgment of 12 
March 2018 [2018] IEHC 119. For an academic appraisal, see inter alia, M Dorociak and 
W Lewandowski, ‘A Check Move for the Principle of Mutual Trust from Dublin: The Celmer 
Case’ (2018) 3 European Papers 857; S Carrera and V Mitsilegas, ‘Upholding the Rule 
of Law by Scrutinising Judicial Independence: The Irish Court’s Request for a Prelimi-
nary Ruling on the European Arrest Warrant’ (2018) CEPS Commentary 2018, available at 
<www.ceps.eu/system/fi les/SCandVM_ROL.pdf> accessed 23 December 2018. 
67  For an early appraisal see, inter alia, P Bárd and W van Ballegooij, Judicial Indepen-
dence as a Precondition for Mutual Trust? The CJEU in Minister for Justice and Equality v 
LM’ (2018) 9 NJECL 353.
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persistent breach of principles laid down in Article 6(1) TEU. For that to 
happen, a unanimous decision of the European Council is required as 
per Article 7(2) TEU. The Court of Justice clarifi ed that in such an event, 
the executing judicial authority would be required to automatically re-
fuse the execution of a European arrest warrant. In the current political 
constellation, this scenario is merely a theoretical proposition that is 
very unlikely to materialise. The political character of the Article 7 TEU 
proceedings, combined with the dominant role prescribed to the Member 
States (acting either as the European Council or the Council) and the 
unanimity requirement for a key decision as well as the fact that the two 
allied Member States are currently subject to the procedure, makes any 
determination of a serious and persistent breach of EU values a highly 
illusory exercise. This, in a nutshell, means that the suspension of the 
EAW mechanism vis-à-vis Poland or Hungary is not on the cards. It does 
not, however, change the fact that in the course of EAW proceedings na-
tional courts face dilemmas similar to those expressed by the referring 
court in Case C-216/18PPU LM. In this respect, the Court of Justice has 
offered a solution along the lines of the Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru ruling.
To begin with, the Court of Justice made it clear that until the Eu-
ropean Council freezes the EAW mechanism in relation to a particu-
lar Member State, the national executing authorities may refuse to give 
effect to European arrest warrants in exceptional circumstances after 
a thorough individual assessment of whether in a particular case the 
person surrendered could be exposed to an unfair trial resulting from a 
lack of independence of the domestic court. The Court of Justice ruled 
that such a decision may be made on the basis of Article 1(3) of the EAW 
Framework Decision. This, as compared to the Aranyosi and Cǎldǎra-
ru ruling and its constructive ambiguity discussed above, is a welcome 
clarifi cation. Once again, it shows an inventive side of the Court of Jus-
tice and the way in which it interprets EU law. It is notable, however, that 
the judges at Kirchberg again opted for phraseology departing from the 
language of the EAW Framework Decision. As the Court of Justice put 
it, the executing authority ‘may refrain […] to give effect to a European 
arrest warrant’.68 In practical terms there is, if any, very little difference 
between ‘refraining’ and ‘non-executing’ a request for surrender. It seems 
now confi rmed that the Court of Justice has opted to turn Article 1(3) 
of the EAW Framework Decision into an additional ground for refusal to 
surrender. The picture emerging from the judgment in question is that 
such a decision should be neither automatic nor taken lightly. Hence, the 
bulk of the Court’s reply to the Irish High Court comprises a detailed ac-
count of what amounts to judicial independence and what factors should 
68  LM (n 34) para 73. 
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be taken into account by national courts when applying the Aranyosi 
and Cǎldǎraru test. 
There are two central elements in the Courts’ reasoning. Firstly, the 
Court of Justice found it fi tting to elaborate in extenso on the importance 
of the rule of law and, in more general terms, the meaning and the scope 
of Articles 2 and 19 TEU. Secondly, the judges at Kirchberg addressed the 
impact of the rule of law breaches on the European arrest warrant mech-
anism. It is not surprising that the Court of Justice has put so much em-
phasis on rule of law matters. In many respects, judges operate in a legal 
lacuna and face competence dilemmas. On the one hand, respect for EU 
values is a pre-condition of EU membership and it is at the heart of EU 
integration. On the other hand, the EU operates under the principle of 
conferral, which − in general terms − precludes interventions in areas 
not falling within its competences.69 One of the problems currently faced 
by the EU and its institutions is that the very generous wording of Article 
2 TEU is not matched by extensive competences in rule-of-law matters. 
Nevertheless, it is rather obvious that respect for the rule of law and the 
existence of independent national judiciaries are essential conditions for 
the application as well as the effectiveness of EU law. This link has been 
extensively dealt with by the Court of Justice in Case C-64/16 Associação 
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas,70 and the discussed 
judgment in Case C-216/18PPU LM cements this emerging line of juris-
prudence and equips the Court of Justice with legal ammunition to deal 
with the already mentioned rule of law infringement proceedings against 
Poland and references from the Polish Courts. One has to agree with 
Matteo Bonelli and Monica Claes that Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical 
dos Juízes Portugueses arrived at a perfect time and amounted to judicial 
serendipity.71 It allowed the Court of Justice to develop key principles in 
a case of lesser political gravity. By the same token, it paved the way for 
highly politicised cases regarding respect for the rule of law in Poland 
and Hungary. As already noted, Case C-216/18PPU LM was the fi rst in 
line. The Court of Justice has emphasised that judicial independence is 
69  For an academic appraisal of the principle of conferral after the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, see, inter alia, G Davies, ‘The Post-Laeken Division of Competences’ (2003) 
28 EL Rev 686; M Dougan, ‘The Convention’s Draft Constitutional Treaty: Bringing Europe 
Closer to Its Lawyers?’ (2003) 28 EL Rev 763; P Craig, ‘Competence: Clarity, Conferral, Con-
tainment and Consideration’ (2004) 29 EL Rev 323; T Tridimas, ‘Competence after Lisbon. 
The Elusive Search for Bright Lines’ in D Ashiagbor, N Countouris and I Lianos (eds), The 
European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon (CUP 2012); M Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 
2007: Winning Minds Not Hearts’ (2008) 45 CML Rev 617; M Claes and B de Witte, ‘Compe-
tences: Codifi cation and Contestation’ in Łazowski and Blockmans (n 20).
70  Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:117. 
71  Bonelli and Claes (n 5).
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at the heart of the fundamental right to a fair trial, which is guaranteed 
by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.72 
The Court of Justice has also brought to the fore Article 19 TEU, 
which ‘gives concrete expression to the value of the rule of law affi rmed 
in Article 2 TEU’.73 It creates an obligation for national courts to guar-
antee full application of EU law in the Member States and protect the 
rights of individuals. This is a well-known treatise, which, with the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, found a proper legal basis in the EU 
Founding Treaties (Article 19 TEU). In this context the independence of 
national courts is a core requirement, also for the effective functioning 
of the EAW, based on mutual trust and mutual recognition. The Court 
of Justice has clarifi ed in turn that the decisions on issuing and on 
execution of European arrest warrants need to be taken by indepen-
dent courts. Furthermore, in paragraph 57 the judges have rather boldly 
emphasised the obvious that even in areas not covered by EU law the 
Member States have to observe the ECHR, in particular the right to a 
fair trial. The Court has in turn provided guidance to national courts 
as to the factors which should be taken into account by the executing 
judicial authority when conducting an assessment of the state of affairs 
in the requesting country. For instance, the Court of Justice delved into 
the external and internal aspects of judicial independence.74 This led to 
the exact modus operandi the national courts should follow. The Court of 
Justice has followed in this respect the test laid down in the judgment in 
Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru, requiring national judges to start with a gener-
al assessment, and then, should doubts arise, follow-up with an individ-
ual analysis based on the clarifi cations received from the requesting ju-
dicial authority. The latter is required even when, as in the case at hand, 
the European Commission publishes a reasoned proposal and, by the 
same token, triggers Article 7 TEU proceedings. The two-step process 
has been summarised by the Court of Justice in the following fashion:
If, having regard to the requirements noted in paragraphs 62 to 67 of 
the present judgment, the executing judicial authority fi nds that there 
is, in the issuing Member State, a real risk of breach of the essence of 
the fundamental right to a fair trial on account of systemic or general-
ised defi ciencies concerning the judiciary of that Member State, such as 
to compromise the independence of that State’s courts, that authority 
must, as a second step, assess specifi cally and precisely whether, in the 
particular circumstances of the case, there are substantial grounds for 
72  See further, inter alia, A Ward, ‘Article 47’ in Peers (n 40).
73  LM (n 34) para 50. 
74  ibid, paras 63-65.
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believing that, following his surrender to the issuing Member State, the 
requested person will run that risk.75 
This amounts to Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru revisited and does not fol-
low the suggestions made by Advocate General Tanchev in his opinion.76 
Furthermore, it fails to address the concerns raised by the Irish High 
Court in its reference for a preliminary ruling about the second step, 
which for reasons explained further below may prove not to be fi t for 
purpose. When it comes to the general assessment, which constitutes 
the fi rst step, the Court of Justice has followed the test laid down in 
Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru. In a nutshell, the executing judicial authority 
must make its assessment based on information that is ‘objective, reli-
able, specifi c and properly updated’.77 The Court of Justice has indicated 
that the material provided by the European Commission in its reasoned 
proposal is based on Article 7(1) TEU. Although this is not mentioned by 
the Court, one should assume that reports of other bodies could be tak-
en into account as well. This would include, for instance, reports of the 
Venice Commission, which operates under the auspices of the Council of 
Europe. Prima facie, the Courts’ conclusion is sound, yet it does not take 
into account the ‘whom to trust’ dilemma. Not surprisingly, the reports 
of the Venice Commission as well as the reasoned proposal of the Euro-
pean Commission have been discredited by the Polish authorities, which 
prefer and promote an alternative understanding of independence of the 
judiciary and the rule of law. The question is whether this in itself may 
lead to confusion among the national courts of other Member States. 
Should they trust at face value the assessments made by international 
institutions or the national authorities of the Member State concerned? 
The fi rst phase, however, seems to be a relatively easy step to take when 
one looks further at the second procedural step required by the Court 
of Justice. Indeed, particular challenges may arise when the national 
executing authority proceeds to engage in dialogue with the authorities 
of the requesting country. This boils down to a fundamental question 
whether one can trust an assessment and evidence provided by a nation-
al court, which − allegedly − is not independent. In the case at hand, the 
doubts expressed by the Irish High Court were exacerbated by a rather 
blunt statement courtesy of the Polish Deputy Minister of Justice, who 
acted in breach of the presumption of innocence by alluding that the 
person subject to the European arrest warrant was a criminal.78 This 
75  ibid, para 68.
76  Case C-216/18PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v LM (Defi ciencies in the system of 
justice) ECLI:EU:C:2018:517, Opinion of AG Tanchev.
77  LM (n 34) para 61.
78  See Irish High Court, Minister for Justice and Equality v Celmer (No 4) judgment of 1 Au-
gust 2018 [2018] IEHC 484.
26 Adam Łazowski: The Sky Is Not the Limit: Mutual Trust and Mutual Recognition après...
has surely undermined the already cracking trust in the Polish judiciary 
and its independence. 
In Case C-216/18PPU LM the Court of Justice concluded that if the 
doubts of the requested court cannot be discounted it may refuse to sur-
render a person requested under the European arrest warrant. This has 
to happen when the executing judicial authority concludes that there is 
‘a real risk that the individual concerned will suffer in the issuing Mem-
ber State a breach of his fundamental right to an independent tribunal 
and, therefore, of the essence of his fundamental right to a fair trial’.79 
In this respect it is interesting to note the two differences between the 
discussed judgment and the decision of the Court of Justice in Aranyosi 
and Cǎldǎraru. Firstly, Article 1(3) of the EAW Framework Decision is 
employed unequivocally as the legal basis for such a decision. Secondly, 
the Court uses a different language to describe the actions of execut-
ing authorities. While in Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru the Court talks about 
bringing the EAW procedure to an end, in the present case the judg-
es at Kirchberg have instructed their domestic counterparts to ‘refrain 
from giving effect to the European Arrest Warrant’.80 Irrespective of the 
phraseology, the end result is, however, just the same. 
3.4.4 Conclusions 
Case C-216/18PPU LM arrived at a crucial time and, not surpris-
ingly, it has triggered a deal of commotion. From the point of view of 
principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition, it encapsulates well 
the evolving legal landscape, which no longer features blind and uncon-
ditional trust in the judicial systems of other Member States. For many 
national judges, it is a welcome development, even though, as academic 
commentators put it, the case-by-case modus operandi laid down therein 
requires the passing of ‘Herculean hurdles’.81 The High Court of Ireland, 
which submitted the reference in the present case, eventually ruled on 
19 November 2018 that the surrender to Poland should be ordered since, 
despite the systemic and generalised defi ciencies in the independence 
of the Polish judiciary, there was no real risk that the requested person 
would be exposed to a fl agrant denial of the right to a fair trial.82 This, 
arguably, is one of the fi rst cases, and many will follow. The key question 
is how domestic courts will proceed in the months to come. Since the 
general suspension of the European arrest warrant system is neither 
79  LM (n 34) para 77.
80  ibid, para 77.
81   Bárd and van Ballegooij (n 67).
82  Irish High Court, The Minister for Justice and Equality v Celmer No 5, 19 November 
2018 [2018] IEHC 639, para 123.
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politically possible nor desired, the burden to assess how much trust 
there is left in the Polish judicial system will remain on the shoulders of 
national judges. 
3.5 Mutual trust and mutual recognition at the time of Brexit
3.5.1 Introduction
The fi nal judgment of this saga deals with the operation of the prin-
ciples of mutual trust and mutual recognition at the time of Brexit. As is 
well known and documented in the academic literature, the UK’s with-
drawal from the European Union will have profound legal implications 
for both the departing country and the remaining twenty-seven Member 
States of the European Union. This, of course, extends to the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, even though the United Kingdom has 
for years benefi ted from a variety of opt-outs.83 Not surprisingly, the un-
certainties surrounding the withdrawal itself, as well as the shape of 
post-Brexit relations between the EU and the UK, have raised doubts in 
national judges dealing with European arrest warrants and other mu-
tual recognition instruments. This eventually led to a reference for a 
preliminary ruling from the Irish High Court and, consequently, to the 
judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-327/18PPU RO. 
3.5.2 Does Brexit undermine mutual trust?
As the title of the present section suggests, the key question that the 
Court of Justice has been asked is whether the period pending the with-
drawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union undermines the 
principle of mutual trust and, as a result, also the mutual recognition 
underpinning judicial cooperation in criminal matters. In a nutshell, the 
judges at Kirchberg answered in the negative. To put it differently, as long 
as a Member State remains in the European Union − even having triggered 
the withdrawal procedure − it is business as usual. As the Court put it:
it must be observed that such a notifi cation does not have the effect 
of suspending the application of EU law in the Member State that has 
given notice of its intention to withdraw from the European Union and, 
consequently, EU law, which encompasses the provisions of the Frame-
work Decision and the principles of mutual trust and mutual recogni-
tion inherent in that decision, continues in full force and effect in that 
State until the time of its actual withdrawal from the European Union.84
83  See, inter alia, V Mitsilegas, ‘Cross-Border Criminal Cooperation after Brexit’ in M Dou-
gan (ed), The UK after Brexit. Legal and Policy Challenges (Intersentia 2017); A Weyembergh, 
Consequences of Brexit for European Union Criminal Law (2017) 8 NJECL 284.
84  RO (n 36) para 45. 
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The judges agreed with Advocate General Szpunar that to rule to 
the contrary would amount to the unilateral suspension of the EAW 
Framework Decision and, at the same time, it would be in breach of its 
recital 10, which permits only for suspension taken in the context of the 
Article 7 TEU proceedings. So, to cut a long story short, the notifi cation 
of intention to withdraw from the European Union does not per se con-
stitute a circumstance justifying refusal to surrender under the EAW 
procedural apparatus. Yet, as the Court of Justice made clear, it does not 
de-activate the obligations resting on the shoulders of national judges as 
per the Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru ruling. In order to discount the doubts 
of the referring court and, presumably, also other executing authorities, 
even when Article 4 of the Charter ceases to apply to the United Kingdom 
on the date of withdrawal, it will still be bound by the ECHR, in particu-
lar its Article 3, which also prohibits inhuman and degrading treatment. 
In equal measure, the Court of Justice attempted to discount the trepi-
dation of the referring court as regards the continuous application of the 
principle of specialty.
3.5.3 Conclusions
The judgment in Case C-327/18PPU RO arrived at a crucial time, 
when many legal aspects of Brexit remain unknown. It makes it clear 
that notifi cation of the intention to withdraw in itself does not undermine 
mutual trust and mutual recognition. Yet, it gives national executing au-
thorities room for manoeuvre when they handle requests for surrender 
closer to the date of Brexit. This is achieved by extending the application 
of the Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru test. When this article was completed all 
bets were off. In a scenario guaranteeing legal certainty at a time of po-
litical chaos, the United Kingdom would leave the EU in accordance with 
the Withdrawal Agreement. If that were the case, it would be subject to 
a transitional period during which the mutual recognition instruments 
would continuously apply. At the same time, a chaotic unilateral with-
drawal should not be dismissed. Leaving political speculation aside, if 
it were to materialise, it would mean that EU law, including the EAW 
Framework Decision, would apply to the United Kingdom until 2020 (or 
even longer). Would that remain business as usual? Time will tell, al-
though more references for preliminary rulings to the Court of Justice 
seem inevitable.85 
85  See the reference in Case C-191/18 KN v The Minister for Justice and Equality, which 
was withdrawn by the referring court in the wake of the judgment in the discussed Case 
C-327/18PPU RO.
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4 Conclusions 
What does the judgment in the Joined Cases Aranyosi and Cǎldǎra-
ru and the follow-up decisions leave us with? To begin with, it has been 
a breaking point for mutual recognition and mutual trust in criminal 
matters. Although carefully worded, and setting the modus operandi that 
should be followed in the event of doubts about respect for fundamental 
rights at the receiving end, the Court in fact opened the door to national 
judges to refuse execution of European arrest warrants. It should be not-
ed that everyday practice will determine whether the door has been left 
merely ajar or wide open. On the one hand, the discussed judgments are 
the answers to dilemmas faced in the multifaceted legal environment. 
On the other hand, they are a challenge to the principle of mutual trust. 
EU law now allows domestic judges to openly question trust in their 
counterparts and the legal systems of other Member States. At the same 
time, this eases the tensions between the obligations on the shoulders of 
domestic judges, courtesy of national law combined with the ECHR and 
Framework Decision 584/2001/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant 
(and some other mutual recognition instruments). In more general terms, 
as argued by L Mancano, the shift in the jurisprudence of the Court 
of Justice ‘restores the balance between fundamental rights protection 
and enforcement demands in the European arrest warrant system’.86 By 
the same token, the Court of Justice has moved the centre of gravity 
from security closer to justice. The question is whether the conclusions 
reached in the Joined Cases Aranyosi and Cǎldǎraru should now also be 
addressed by the EU legislator. To put it differently, if a revision of the 
EAW Framework Decision were to materialise, should Articles 3-4a be 
amended in order to codify the jurisprudence coming from Kirchberg? 
It should be noted that a precedent has been set in Directive 2014/41/
EU on the European Investigation Order, which envisages fundamental 
rights as a non-recognition ground.87 Yet, for now, any formal revision of 
the EAW Framework Decision remains merely a theoretical proposition 
as there is clearly no appetite to proceed with any revision of the legal 
act in question. This, in turn means that the question whether to sur-
render or not, when in doubt about respect for fundamental rights, will 
remain to be answered solely by national courts (assisted by the Court of 
86  L Mancano, ‘A New Hope? The Court of Justice Restores the Balance between Funda-
mental Rights Protection and Enforcement Demands in the European Arrest Warrant Sys-
tem’ in Brière and Weyembergh (n 6).
87  Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 
regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters [2014] OJ L130/1. See 
further A Erbežnik, ‘Mutual Recognition in EU Criminal Law and Fundamental Rights: The 
Necessity for a Sensitive Approach’ in Brière and Weyembergh (n 6) 197-199.
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Justice). And this will boil down to the fundamental question of whether 
their counterparts in the other Member States can be trusted. Trust has 
not yet been lost, but, as the cases discussed in this article demonstrate, 
it has been put to the test.
